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The debate surrounding the ideological underpinning of the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) has been a constant companion to the 
development of policy both in government and in opposition since 
the Parties origins in the 1890s. The privatisation debate ofthe 1980s 
saw the Hawke governments come under sustained criticism for the 
shifting of the Party to the right and for the betrayal of the Labor 
tradition. This paper will examine the privatisation debate in the light 
ofthis concept of tradition, and its usefulness to historians in trying 
to gain an insight into the motivations of the protagonists of the 
time. The fundamental nature of the privatisation debate to the 
understanding of what the ALP actually stands for makes it an 
important and controversial subject for labour historians. Much 
previous work in this area, due not least to the closeness ofthe era to 
current writing, has been of a highly politicised and partisan nature. 
A more sober overview of this crucial debate within the Labor Party, 
focussing less on whether Hawke was right, and more on the impact 
of the debate on the positioning of 1980s Labor in relation to its past 
is necessary. This paper will argue that an awareness of the 
complexities and contradictions of the concept of tradition is essential 
to the study of this debate, and that an understanding of the 
evolutionary nature of this tradition is needed to link the Hawke 
governments of this era to Labor governments of the past. 
There are many competing views as to what constitutes the Labor 
tradition, and it will be argued in this paper that there is no one true 
tradition. However an example of some popular concepts of the Labor 
tradition will help clarity the argument. In Transforming Labor, Peter 
Beilharz argues that there are three main "golden ages" of Labor 
history focused on by different groups within the Party.' Some look 
to the Party's formation in the period of the Great Strikes of the 
1890s as what Beilharz describes as a " ... foundation of fire" and the 
moment when Labor was closest to its working class origins. 2 Others 
look to the 1940s and the Curtin and Chifley governments as the 
"golden age" of full employment and opportunities of post-war 
reconstruction.3 Still others see the Whitlam era of the early 1970s 
as the benchmark. 4 These periods are idealised and romanticised and 
are then used to measure present incarnations. 
Eric Hobsbawm defines this as "inventing tradition" and suggests 
that, "[i]n short, they are responses to novel situations which take 
the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own 
past by quasi-obligatory repetition".5 The privatisation debate of the 
1980s saw this concept of tradition mobilised by both sides in arguing 
for a more market oriented approach to the ownership of Government 
Business Enterprises (GBE), or in appealing to an interventionist 
past. That privatisation is now part of the Labor tradition is an 
example of the evolutionary nature of these "invented traditions", if 
one that many contemporary members feel uncomfortable with. 
In examining the Hawke governments relationship to any Labor 
tradition, an understanding of what the Party had committed itself to 
by the time of the 1983 Federal election, particularly in relation to 
public ownership, is essential. The 1982 ALP Platform began with 
the statement of the "Objectives", committing the Party to " ... the 
democratic socialisation of industry, production, distribution and 
exchange, to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation 
ambiguous, section two would appear to be more explicit, committing 
the Party to the "establishment and development of public enterprises, 
based upon federal, state and other forms of social ownership, in 
appropriate sectors of the economy".? The 1982 Conference that had 
developed this Platform had however passed a resolution that gave 
the incoming Hawke government some freedom. Policies geared 
toward producing a "sustained economic recovery" were to be given 
precedence over all other Platform commitments.8 This was to prove 
a significant caveat. 
The future arguments within the Party dealing with privatisation 
were to centre on this commitment to public ownership, both 
"traditionally" and explicitly in the Platform, and the need for those 
arguing for privatisation to convince the Party to change the Platform 
to allow for major enterprise sales. With the focus of the Hawke 
government's shortened first term being the deregulation of the 
finance and banking sector and the establishment of the Accord, it 
was during the second term that the privatisation debate emerged as 
a central and divisive issue. The Coalition had begun highlighting 
the potential for the privatisation of public enterprises such as 
Australian Airlines (orTAA in the early 1980s), Qantas and Medibank 
Private, with at least the deregulation of Telecom under consideration 
by the 1984 Federal election. In 1985 the Liberal Party committed 
itself to the sale of the Housing Loans Insurance Corporation, the 
Australian Industry Development Corporation and Medibank Private, 
and to examining other enterprises including the Commonwealth 
Bank.9 
Labor attacked the Coalition's policy at this time, with senior 
figures including Hawke and Keating making strong statements 
reaffirming Labor's commitment to public ownership and opposition 
to any "Thatcherite" privatisation plans. In a quote that was to be 
consistently used against his later pro-privatisation arguments, Hawke 
stated in July 1985 that the proposed sale of assets by the Liberal 
Party would be" ... a one-offfire sale; a 'sale of the century' of your 
assets, the assets of the people of Australia. They would transfer 
them into the hands of a privileged few to the cost of every one of 
us".'o Keating also went on the record in May 1985 stating that: "No 
matter where one looks whether it be at TAA or the other authorities 
there is no case for the Opposition's argument in economics except 
simply to indulge ideologically in a Thatcherite vandalistic splurge 
to try and destroy these authorities"." 
By early 1986 however changes began to appear publicly at the 
top levels of the ALP in its attitude toward the privatisation issue. 
Minister for Finance Senator Peter Walsh made a speech to a seminar 
on the topic of privatisation organised by the Financial Review for 
February 26, 1986 in which he stated that" ... if its cheaper to put 
the control of operations of public enterprises into private hands, 
then I'd like to do it that way".'2 Walsh went on to suggest that he 
had no particular ideological preference for public or private 
ownership, and that he was disappointed that people were allowing 
the privatisation debate to become "politicised and polarised".13 
"Those at the conservative end of the spectrum want to privatise 
everything that moves. Some at the progressive end s~em to favour 
and other anti-social features in these fields".6 Does this 
objective commit the Party to public ownership? If this is EJ 
public ownership at all costs, simply because the conservatives 
want privatisation".14 Walsh was not suggesting wholesale 
privatisation of GBE in this speech, in fact making the point 
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that selling off the "good performers" and leaving those with worse 
balance sheets was a major flaw in the opposition's approach, but it 
was a significant public shift in emphasis from a significant figure 
within the Cabinet. 
The June 1986 policy discussion paper Statutory Authorities and 
Government Business Enterprises; Proposed Policy Guidelines, 
echoed the tenor of Walsh's February speech in calling for a more 
rational, less "ideological" debate. 15 As an official statement of future 
policy direction this provides greater evidence of the government's 
thinking. It again criticises those who "". seem to favour public 
ownership at all cost ... " and establishes the guidelines for the future 
control of GBE along deregulated, "market - oriented" lines. 16 The 
paper goes on to state that: "The proposed approach to government 
business enterprises has three specific components: the preparation 
of strategic plans including financial performance objectives; a 
reduction in direct controls over the day to day operations of 
enterprises; and improved quality of information for the assessment 
of enterprise performance". 17 The first two of these were of particular 
significance to the broader debate in that the government was both 
deregulating in terms of its direct control over the enterprises, and 
through setting financial objectives, demanding a commercial rate 
of return. 
Thus by 1986 the Hawke government had made significant 
strides toward the deregulation of the public sector and the framework 
for the major skirmishes within the Party over the issue in the lead 
up to the 1988 National Conference had been laid. In calling for the 
removal of "ideology" from the debate, and in implicitly 
acknowledging the need for a more market oriented approach to the 
management of major public enterprises the Hawke ministry would 
appear to be moving away from adherence to any "socialist objective" 
in regard to public ownership. While not at this stage calling for 
actual privatisation, the shift in approach toward the GBE was seen 
by many as a step in that direction and from mid 1986 onward, the 
privatisation debate was well under way within the ALP. 
1987 was to prove a key year in the development of the 
privatisation debate. On the first of April the Prime Minister 
announced in response to a question in Parliament that the Labor 
government would be considering the "disposal of some public 
assets". 18 "I simply say to the Leader of the Opposition that, unlike 
the Opposition, my Government is not a captive of any privatisation 
ideology. We have adopted a calm and reasoned approach on this 
matter."19 He went on to suggest that the needs of the economy and 
the community changed over time and that part of a "normal Budget 
process" was to assess all public expenditure and asset~.20 
Hawke was preparing the way for the asset sales that were to be 
announced in the Economic Statement of 13th May, 1987. This 
statement of Budget Initial Measures announced one billion dollars 
worth of asset sales, including the sale of Williamstown Naval 
Dockyard; the sale of part of Australia's Embassy site in Tokyo and 
the former Ambassadors residence in Paris, among other 
Commonwealth holdings.21 Reflecting Hawke's statement quoted 
above, the actual Budget paper itself states that "These sales are part 
of a sensible ongoing review of assets and holdings which the 
Government has been undertaking over recent years. They have not 
been motivated by any ideological view like some privatisation 
campaigns overseas".22 
The 1987 election was called on 27th May, and shortly after the 
election victory the Prime Minister declared himself in favour of 
examining the potential for privatisation of the GBE, not just the 
'assets and holdings' so far announced. The election having been on 
11 th July, by mid August the anti-privatisation forces within 
the Party and the broader labour movement began a more 
concerted public campaign of opposition. Senior Vice-
President of the ACTU and Secretary of the NSW Labor Council 
John MacBean suggested on 16th August that the union movement 
would "call for the scrapping of the prices and incomes accord if the 
government moved forward on any planned major enterprise sales", 
and that the "view of the ACTU executive was 'bloody near' 
unanimous".23 The Victorian ALP conference on the weekend of the 
15th and 16th of August had passed a motion condemning any sell 
off of major enterprises such as Australian Airlines, Qantas, Australia 
Post, Telecom and the Commonwealth Bank.24 As holder of a 
Victorian seat the message could not have been clearer to Hawke. 
However the plans of Hawke and Keating for further asset sales 
remained unclear. The crux of the argumentjorpotential privatisation 
presented by Hawke was that the need to reduce government spending 
and the need to restrict public sector borrowing as a drain on available 
finance and levels of debt, may inhibit the growth of GBE and reduce 
their efficiency and value to the public.25 The government could not 
afford to simultaneously inject large quantities of capital into 
enterprises such as the airlines and fund initiatives in the social 
security and health areas. 
With the next National Conference of the Party set for June 1988 
the leadership pushed hard to gain support for a change to the Platform 
to allow for privatisation. The major figures that indicated support 
at least for debating the issue included Hawke and Keating 
themselves, Finance Minister Walsh, Senate Leader John Button, 
and the new Transport and Communications Minister Gareth Evans. 
Evans was to do much of the work to deregulate the airline industry; 
in particular drawing up the bill to end the Two-Airlines Agreement 
that was introduced on 7th October 1987. It was Evans who was to 
most clearly articulate the need for capital injections to run the major 
GBE successfully, and to argue strongly in the lead up to June 1988 
that the party should at least consider the relaxation of its opposition 
to privatisation. 
Despite the support of these powerful figures privatisation was 
opposed strongly from within the Cabinet itself. Administrative 
Services Minister Stewart West was quoted as having attacked 
privatisation plans in a speech delivered to a conference ofthe Left 
in Canberra in October 1987.26 West suggested that public enterprises 
could be made more efficient without recourse to sale, and that the 
money they required could be financed by borrowing without placing 
any more pressure on money markets than would private sector 
borrowings.27 Outside Cabinet, other Labor members of parliament 
made strong anti-privatisation speeches in the House.2B Clearly there 
was a significant coalition of opposition to privatisation among both 
the Parliamentary Party and the broader Labour movement. A motion 
by the Centre Left of the Party moved in Caucus in November of 
1987 by Senator Peter Cook calling on ministers to provide reports 
on ways of securing the capital needs of major GBE while 
maintaining full public ownership, almost ended the debate at this 
point. Only a last minute compromise under heavy pressure from 
Hawke personally, (it was claimed he lobbied Cook during a plane 
flight!), managed to secure an agreement to keep debate alive "to 
ensure a wider public understanding of the issues involved".29 
The Conference of early June then was one overshadowed by 
the divisions over the privatisation issue. A comprehensive defeat 
for the party leader on the floor of the Conference was not something 
the Party could afford politically while in government, and with the 
numbers against any change to the platform and with Hawke having 
led the debate publicly a compromise had to be found. To save face 
for the Parliamentary leadership of the Party a compromise was 
moved by Senator Michael Beahan of the Centre Left faction, and 
seconded by Senator Evans of the Right to refer the question 
of how to fund the capital requirements of the two publicly 















committee.30 This committee could consider all options including 
full or partial privatisation, but if these were to be promoted a Special 
Conference would need to be called to allow for any changes to the 
Platform to be debated. 31 This was passed ahead ofa motion put by 
the Left arguing for an end to the divisive privatisation debate and 
recognition of the Party's traditional commitment to public 
ownership.32 The numbers were not there to change Labor's policy 
commitment rejecting privatisation, but the faction system was able 
to secure a compromise deal that seemed to be a defeat for just about 
everybody, but importantly for the pro-privatisation forces, kept the 
debate alive. 
While leaving the headlines for some time after the Conference, 
the debate dragged on within the PartY and was reignited publicly 
by Hawke's post 1990 election commitment to the pursuit of micro-
economic reform in the telecommunications sector. The cross 
factional committee of the 1988 compromise motion was never to 
report but the push to end Telecom's monopoly position, in 
conjunction with plans to partially privatise the airlines, and the deal 
with Victoria that led to the sale of one third of the Commonwealth 
Bank, resulted in the calling ofthe Special Conference to change the 
Platform.33 The partial privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank to 
fund the purchase of the ailing State Bank of Victoria was in fact 
secured before the Special Conference called for 24th September had 
debated the proposed changes to the ALP Platform to allow for 
privatisation. The deal was incredibly neat in simultaneously allowing 
for partial privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank, saving the 
Victorian ALP government from financial disaster, and presenting 
an almost unarguable case for privatisation to a left wing Premier. 
Keating's office was reported in The Age of 25th August as saying 
" ... honestly, there's no trick".34 Keating had been able to move 
quickly in securing the deal before full party approval by arguing 
the urgent financial necessity of the change and that in his reading 
of the platform it wasn't controversial as it was expanding the size 
and influence of the Commonwealth Bank and that it was still in 
majority public ownership.35 
Less than a month out from the Special Conference that would 
have to make the decision regarding the ALP's policy toward 
privatisation, the Commonwealth Bank deal complicated the debate, 
but crucially for those promoting change, forced the Party to accept 
change in the enterprise perhaps most valued. As Michelle Grattan 
argued in The Age, " .. .if a third or nearly half of the hallowed 
Commonwealth Bank goes, is it much use fretting over 49 percent 
of Qantas?"36 In the end, the Conference was still very hard fought, 
with the Party exhibiting strong divisions over the issue within 
parliament in the weeks leading up to it37, and on the Conference 
floor. The debate was described as "heaping insult upon insult"38 
with Barry Jones saying there were" ... more dead sacred cows here 
than in an abattoir".39 The Cabinet proposals to alter the 
telecommunications monopoly, to privatise AUSSAT and to allow 
for the forty-nine percent privatisation of Qantas and one hundred 
percent of Australian Airlines were all eventually accepted. The 
telecommunications reforms were the hardest won, with the vote 
being fifty-eight for to forty-three against40. The Airlines changes 
were passed sixty to thirty-nine.41 The Commonwealth Bank deal 
was not extensively debated having already been announced. 
While initially only authorising the sale of Australian Airlines 
and forty-nine percent of Qantas, by June 1992 it had been announced 
that Qantas would purchase Australian Airlines as part of a merger 
deal, and would then be sold in its entirety.42 Twenty-five percent of 
the merged airline was sold in a trade sale to British Airways in 
March 1993, with the remaining seventy-five percent being 
was initially intended to have only thirty percent private ownership. 
By August of 1993 a Bill was introduced to the House to sell down 
a further nineteen percent, and in October 1995 the Keating 
government introduced the Bill that was to see one hundred percent 
of the bank sold.44 The telecommunications reforms announced as 
part of the package approved by the Special Conference of 1990 
were passed with some Senate amendments, but no further sale of 
Telecom was undertaken by the Labor government. In the ten years 
that had elapsed between the strong condemnation by Hawke and 
Keating of the Opposition's privatisation policies as" a one off fire 
sale", and" ... a vandalistic splurge" the government had engineered 
the full sale of Australian Airlines, Qantas and the Commonwealth 
Bank, among other less symbolically important assets such as the 
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories and the Williamstown Naval 
Dockyard. 
The privatisation debate can then be seen to have been at the 
centre of claims of a "sell out" of Labor tradition by the Hawke 
governments of the 1980's, and furthered under Keating after 1991. 
The issue of Labor's commitment to public ownership was seen by 
many to be at the core of what it meant to "be Labor". Hawke's view 
may have been that "over time, clearly, the needs of the economy 
and the community generally change and so too will an efficient use 
of public capital",45 but by the Special Conference of 1990 he was 
unable to convince many within the Federal Parliamentary Caucus, 
let alone the broader labour movement. In speeches to the House in 
the two weeks leading up to the 1990 Special Conference, Left wing 
figures such as Stewart West and Frank Walker argued strenuously 
against privatisation. West argued that any large scale privatisation 
program would place "heavy demands on domestic savings and 
means a certain increase to our already overloaded foreign debt".46 
Frank Walker's speech went further, calling into question the 
leadership's commitment to Labor's heritage and damning its "blind 
faith in the inherent value of competition",41 Walker wondered 
whether " ... these admittedly fundamental economic changes 
constitute a permanent catapulting of Labor deep into the spectrum 
of right wing politics or merely a temporary aberration during tough 
times.48 
Hawke tried consistently during the debate to negate this line of 
argument by emphasising the lack of "ideology" in his approach. 
For Hawke and other pro-privatisation figures such as Evans, Walsh 
and Keating the issue was less an argument of Labor adopting a 
"New-Right" free-market approach to the issue, and more about a 
pragmatic choice between the need to spend scarce public funds on 
buying new aircraft for Qantas and Australian Airlines, and spending 
on welfare and social justice programs. In attempting to differentiate 
his position, and by his definition Labor's, from the Opposition's 
privatisation plans Hawke added, "The difference between us will 
be one of ideology. Our change will be based upon the proposition 
that we need to have competition in the telecommunications sector, 
including retaining a fully publicly owned telecommunications 
facility. That will distinguish us from the Opposition" .49 
It is this question of the capacity to remove "ideology" from the 
privatisation debate that seems to be so problematic. The ideology 
that Hawke was referring to was the Coalition's commitment to the 
economic theories of the "New-Right", however those critical ofthe 
Party under Hawke's leadership, including people like Frank Walker 
and Stewart West from within its ranks, were bemoaning the influence 
of this "free market" ideology on 1980's Labor. Not only did the 
Hawke government appear to be moving the party away from any 
"socialist objective", it was accepting many of the pro-private 
enterprise beliefs that this objective was accepted as opposing. 
held back by the government until 1995:3 The Commonwealth 
Bank, perhaps the most controversial of the major asset sales EJ 




The privatisation debate was then central to the Party's 
understanding of who they were and what they represented. Concepts 
of tradition are central to this understanding, and the privatisation 
debate can be seen to have chaIlenged some of the longest held 
elements of these traditions. In looking at the Party platform 
documents as they developed over the century, the recurring theme 
stated up front in the Objective from 1921 onward was the 
commitment to "socialisation". The "socialist" nature of this 
commitment has been a source of debate and not little disappointment 
to many, seeing "socialisation" as shorthand for "nationalisation", 
but it was at least assumed to confer a commitment to the public 
ownership of the major enterprises that had been established. The 
Commonwealth Bank had been founded by Labor in 1912 and the 
Chifley government of the 1940's had seen Qantas come under 
government control and the domestic airline, TAAset up as a publicly 
owned competitor to the privately owned Ansett.5o The failed attempt 
to fully nationalise the banks by the same government, and the role 
played by the constitution in thwarting Chifley's aims has become a 
further raIlying point for those in the Party claiming Labor's 
commitment to public ownership as fundamental to the Labor 
tradition. 
If the extent of Labor's commitment to its Socialist Objective 
has been a matter of long term debate, the role played by public 
ownership as a manifestation of Labor's commitment to 
"socialisation" must then come under similar question. In their 
examination ofthe socialist objective as it stood in 1980, both Evans 
and Reeves argue that "socialisation" was intended to mean more 
than a literal translation to "nationalisation" and that in any event 
the Constitutional impediments of Section 92 as used against the 
Chifley government's nationalisation plans had made any hopes for 
a radical shift from private sector ownership of industry to public 
impossible.5! Reeves suggests that Labor's response to this 
constitutional impediment to its plans was to establish public 
enterprises in competition with similar private sector enterprises and 
that this was " ... an exceIlent way of having effective general 
economic management by the government within the area".52 Thus 
while stopped from any path to complete nationalisation, the Party 
could still establish active public enterprises.53 
The privatisation debate brought into sharp focus the question 
of the ALP's commitment to its Objective, and raised the question 
of what did it stand for by the end of the 1980's? As Hughes and 
Emy put it "Even if no-one seriously argued for socialisation or 
nationalisation any more; even if economic realities had changed, 
the ALP still stood for public enterprise. With this gone, many now 
wonder what the party stands for".54 The question of the ideological 
underpinning of the Party, despite Hawke's attempts to avoid or 
marginalise it as an issue, were thrown into stark relief through the 
push to change the Party's platform in the 1980's. Whether Hawke 
saw his Party as having an "ideological" debate or not, the distance 
created by the privatisation issue between platform, tradition and 
policy centred on questions of ideology. 
So what were the motivating factors behind Labor's change in 
policy direction during the 1980's? In terms of the specific 
privatisation issue, the reasons outlined by Hawke, Walsh, Evans 
and others during the debate centred on the capital requirements of 
the big public enterprises, and the inability of government in trying 
to "balance" the Budget and restrain public sector debt, funding both 
social policy areas and the needs of airlines and banks. Competition 
and efficiency of service provision were also promoted as factors in 
favour of privatisation, but these arguments were seized on by 
opponents as being achievable through deregulation and the 
setting up of public enterprise along more "market-oriented" 
in June 1986 in discussion paper form, and finalised by November 
1987, argued along these lines, as discussed earlier. Privatisation 
was however just one of the more controversial examples ofa wider 
trend of a movement away from the interventionist tradition of 
Australian governance. The deregulation ofthe finance industry was 
another significant example of the "liberalisation" ofthe Australian 
economy that was begun during the Hawke government's tenure, 
and continued into the 1990's. 
There were other significant factors leading the Hawke 
governments to liberalise the economy. Michael Pusey has argued 
that the role of senior public servants in promoting liberalisation 
played a very influential part.56 In conducting a sociological study 
of the upper echelons of the Commonwealth public service Pusey 
found not a group of apolitical "centrists", but an influential body of 
people pursuing a strong "free market" agenda.57 Pusey argued that: 
"It may be that the bureaucracy have corralled the reformist and 
economically oriented Hawke government into a narrowing and 
increasingly exclusive commitment to an "economic rationalism' 
that is at odds with the broad thrust of the ALP's policies. "58 In 
response to Pusey's questionnaires asking, among other things, what 
these members of the Commonwealth Senior Executive Service 
thought were the most pressing problems facing Australia in the mid 
1980's, around two-thirds saw economic difficulties as being of most 
concern and Pusey states: " ... there was an inward smile of approval 
towards the policies of Mrs Thatcher or Mr Reagan in the early 1980's 
and an underlying assumption that the standard for testing the worth 
of a politician ought to be the vigour with which they cleared the 
way for economic change".59 
By itself, Pusey's thesis doesn't necessarily explain the changes 
in policy approach by the Hawke government during the 1980 's, but 
it does show that one of the government's strongest sources of advice 
and assistance in policy formulation was leaning toward ''New-Right'' 
arguments. The editorials of major newspapers covering the 
privatisation debate at the time also betray an acceptance of a "free-
market" approach to the issue. In writing of the opposition within 
the ALP to the potential for the sale of public enterprises, The 
Australian of 24th November, 1987 stated: "In any case, it is not the 
role of the government to run a business or worse, impede the 
development of one with regulations designed to protect a 
monopoly."60 It went on: "Governments should get on with the job 
of governing undisturbed by the problems of running banks, airlines 
or telephone companies".6! In its reportage of the 1988 National 
Conference TheAustralian of 8th June, 1988 savaged the opposition 
within the Party to the platform changes saying: "It demonstrates 
that even though the Labor Party has changed a great deal in recent 
years its blinkered ideological outlook can still stand in the way of 
sensible reform. There is no reason in principle, and no justification 
in terms of efficiency or equity for the Government to run enterprises 
such as airlines, or banks. The private sector can do it more efficiently 
and competitively".62 The Age of 6th June, 1988 espoused a similar 
opinion suggesting: "In the name of economic management, the 
Government has no choice but to press ahead with moves to cut the 
cost and raise the efficiency of public enterprises ... ".63 
Given that the Coalition, especially the Liberal Party moved 
further to the Right during the 1980's in trying to assert their position 
as the true Party of private enterprise, the picture that emerges is that 
of a strong impetus to an acceptance of the "rationality" of a more 
liberal, "free market" approach to government. Through a union of 
the senior public service, sections of the media and their political 
opposition the ALP was under significant pressure to accept the "free 
lines. 55 The government's own guidelines for GBE as released EJ 
market" approach as the pragmatic, rational approach to 
solving Australia's economic problems. Governments do not 
work in a vacuum, and are products of both their traditions, 
and the prevailing discourse of the time. The Hawke government in 
particular, coming into office at a time of recession and with the 
rhetoric of being the agent of "reconciliation" and "recovery" 
prominent in it's campaign, was open to ideas that while perhaps 
antithetical to ALP tradition, were presented as being pragmatic and 
rational in the circumstances. 
In Transforming Labor, Peter Beilharz describes the years 1983-
1993 as being an era of "innovation and exhaustion in Australian 
politics".64 The ALP took on the role of attempting to modernise the 
Australian economy and its political framework from what Beilharz 
refers to as its "settler-capitalist" tradition, in response to the challenge 
of "the global system".6S He suggests that in the process they "emptied 
out" the Labor tradition and Labor as a result were "transformed".66 
This paper argues that rather than "emptying out" the Labor tradition 
in achieving the "transformation" of the 1980's, the Hawke 
government accentuated the pragmatic strain present in this tradition. 
That there are significant differences between the Hawke Labor 
government's "free market" approach, and the Labor heritage of a 
more "interventionist" economic outlook is obvious, however to try 
and establish the concept of a Labor tradition without including the 
Party's longest period of office is to render the term redundant. The 
Hawke governments of the 1980s "transformed" Labor, not least in 
terms of changing the Party's commitment to public ownership. The 
length and divisiveness ofthe privatisation debate brought into sharp 
focus the changes being wrought to the Party's concept of what it 
stood for, and highlighted the exhaustion of the commitment to any 
"socialist objective". 
In using tradition as a link between a view of the past, and the 
needs of the present, an acceptance of the complexities and 
contradictions of the concept is necessary. It is useful to historians 
attempting to understand the difficulties and divisions faced by the 
ALP in dealing with the privatisation issue in that it helps explain 
the baggage carried into the debate by various sides. Ifpragmatism 
and dealing with accepted "realities" were the only motivating forces 
behind political action then an issue like the debate over public 
ownership would not have been so divisive. That much of the Party 
saw the privatisation question in terms of a "selling out" of Labor 
tradition requires us to try and examine what lies behind this concept. 
That there may be significant complexities and contradictions to 
acknowledge does not negate its usefulness. These complexities help 
us in looking back to appreciate the emotions involved in the debate, 
and the motivations of the various actors. 
The Hawke government did then "hi-jack" the Labor Party in 
the 1980s. It didn't however step in from some "other realm" and 
transform a previously pure political entity. The Labor Party has 
always argued amongst itself as to what its "true" direction should 
be. As can be seen by the current 1998 Platform, the ALP has been 
"transformed" to some degree by the changes of the I 980s,67 Gone 
is the "socialist objective" and any reference to "socialisation".68 In 
its place are a series of references to the challenges of "global is at ion", 
and a commitment to " ... an effective and efficient public sector 
operating in partnership with a thriving private sector ... ".69 Thus the 
Party and platform have evolved. Whether they are able to take their 
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